Command and Control in Wargaming Games with Historian

Today we bring you a unique article that started over a beer, but we managed to convince Jakub Samek to do a short interview on our blog, in which we take a look at some of the mechanics we know from Napoleonic wargaming games. Jakub Samek is one of the leading members of the Central European Napoleonic Society, co-organizer of the Battle of Austerlitz, and runs the Austerlitz.org website where you can find a number of great works and translations from his pen. He is also the author of the recent book Napoleon Bonaparte, where you will not find a manual on how to dig trenches, or the work of a sniper with a rifle scope, but instead you will find a whole range of details about what warfare was like at that time. Jakub is also an officer in the French 57th Line Regiment with the rank of Captain in the re-enactment and a recipient of the Legion of Honour CENS. So looking at the contemporary nomenclature, one could say he is a security analyst of the Napoleonic era :-D.

(R are questions and texts of the editors, JS are answers of Jakub)

R: Jakub, thank you for taking the time to talk to us. Let's start with something simple, did I forget something in the context regarding Napoleonics?

JS: I'm being modest, but I guess I'd add the translator of the regulation on the exercise and manoeuvres of the (French) infantry of 1 August 1791, a thing that automatically helped me a lot to understand the basic inner mechanisms of the small tactics of our time.

R: Maybe the Battlegrounds?

JS: John Tiller's Battlegrounds have been unsurpassed tactical games for almost thirty years. In fact, I started with them as well, and even after thirty years of interest in the subject there's not much to fault them. It is, on the computer, definitely the most Napoleonic war, and it's a damn shame that other battles besides Borodino and Waterloo (including Ligny and Quatre-Bras) aren't similarly treated; the subsequent series devoted to 1809 no longer has my heart. There were plenty of mods of the time, but perhaps only Eylau was elaborated and polished to near perfection.

R: How long have you been involved with Napoleon, why did you choose this period and why the French?

JS: For a long time; in re-enactment since 2003. I've had a relationship with France since I was a kid, my mom was a French translator/interpreter, I love it there. I'm most interested in their military, I have access to sources and literature and enjoy it.

R: Our conversation should help to get a feel for some of the mechanics that wargaming games bring to the table and compare them to the real-world application of the Napoleonic battlefield. Unlike the Kriegspiel staff games of the past, wargaming is mostly played without a referee according to a template defined by the mechanics. Historical games, then, tend to be primarily simulation-based games that attempt to place decision-making processes appropriate to the period in front of the player in the position of the commanding officer. Of course, with the understanding that the commanding officer has a god mode. That is, he knows the rules, he knows the battlefield, and he can see the enemy. To keep the game from being a monotonous roll of the dice, Claussewitz's friction or fog of war comes into play by increasing the influence of randomization on the game. And the most common way is to limit the ability of the chain of command to control subordinate units. Various forms of non-linear unit activation are typical examples.

For me, this is probably the hardest game mechanic to grasp. When I get the rolls wrong, my brigade forgets that just 30 minutes ago (games usually have a land and time scale) it was marching to Pratec Heights, even though it is still following the same orders.

To paraphrase the director of a bad movie, it's just a game, and none of us were there, but let's get to our questions.

How were the general orders formulated before the battle and to what depth did they go? To the battalion commanders or to the individual lieutenants? Is there a redundancy in the process of transmitting orders? How does the chain of command actually work?

JS: The basic tactical unit of infantry is the battalion, for cavalry it is more like a regiment, but it depends a lot on the situation, for artillery, if we disregard the battalion guns, it is a division or battery, I'm not going to go into terminology here, but sometimes it sticks (a division of artillery is made up, in France, of an artillery company and a company or half company of artillery; the word battery already refers to the battle formation of this division). A lieutenant is at all events entirely outside what is called the chain of command. If we take it from the bottom up in infantry, we have the chief of battalion, above him a general of brigade (colonel and infantry regiment come into play only in specific situations), above him a general of division, and a corps commander. With cavalry, in France, the chief of squadron commands two squadrons, and these are still very much more tactical sub-units of the regiment - so there we have a chain of more of a colonel-brigadier-divisional general, or directly above the brigadier-general to the corps commander if the corps cavalry forms only a brigade or a weak division.

The artillery is even different - the artillery commander at the general staff level does not interfere in the performance on the battlefield, with specific exceptions; the divisional artillery is disposed of by the divisional general, the corps reserve by the corps commander; battalion pieces are mechanically subject to the chief of battalion.

The order issued before the battle by the commander-in-chief in the form of some general disposition is addressed to the corps commanders; and it is then their responsibility, in which naturally the commander-in-chief may interfere, to carry it on in their situation, their space, their time, and with the means they have. If, for example, at Austerlitz, Napoleon stipulates before the battle that the manoeuvre of the day will be "to march forward in echelons, with the right wing in advance," he need add no more detail, for the battle formation of the corps concerned (i.e., the 4th and 5th) is obvious and given; and so is the internal structure of the various divisions. Specifically for the 5th Corps he says: "Marshal Lannes will see that the divisions of Suchet and Caffarelli are always behind the hill, and that the enemy cannot see them." Caffarelli is the first division, Suchet is the third division - that is, Suchet stands on the left, Caffarelli on the right, but it is unnecessary to say so, they automatically manoeuvre all the time, and they also pass the night that way before the battle.

These are the orders that the commander-in-chief may give - general sense of movement, general direction, starting position, time; or he may emphasize, as in the case of Lannes, some requirement depending on the terrain. Neither the chief of battalion nor the brigadier general needs to know any of this, though a general awareness of the overall sense of the maneuver may help them, and is useful if they, especially the brigadier general, get temporarily bumped up a level because of casualties or other influences. The corps commander then issues his own orders to the division commanders, and for brigades and battalions it is essentially a "follow me" with the division general and his staff and aides handling the details. The order of units is given, unless otherwise specified, the formation is determined. There is nothing not to understand. The more junior rank, the more mechanical and without room for any initiative or decision.

I understand that when you see everything on the game board, chance is introduced with some roll of the dice into the process of war, and I have absolutely no idea how to make it work well - but one thing is certain: senior officers and generals are not robots, and when they get out of range of their superior and into an unusual situation, they naturally react. They have limitations imposed by what they know about the intent of their superiors, what they know about the wider area, what they know about the movement of their own and enemy troops - the corps commander naturally has a better grasp of this than the brigadier general, because the brigadier general's job up to now has been to ensure that orders from above are carried out, to oversee order in his own formation, and his attention is focused on the tactical situation in the brigade's area of deployment. He does not devote himself to reconnaissance reports and does not receive information from the general staff, he had no reason to study the map in depth, his situational awareness is different from the division level. Even less so the chief of battalion, whose main attention is focused on his direct subordinates and the mechanical subunits he forms and sets in motion mechanically, the execution of which he is directly responsible for.

On the other hand, I can imagine a wounded divisional commander disappearing from the scene, being replaced from elsewhere or by a selected brigade commander, and the formation falters; it does not know if it is already sufficiently forward, it does not know from where it can expect the enemy. The options and possibilities and combinations of options are innumerable. Alternatively, the situation changes - a good example is the rear of Langeron's column on the Pratzenberg. The last units had already seen the French heading for the top - but there was no one with enough authority, insight and decisiveness to stop and turn the last brigade. By the time a report came to the head of the column to the commander, and by the time he decided to change the advance, it was too late.

R: Imagine a situation where you are a corps commander commanding three brigades, two infantry, one cavalry and some artillery reserve. You've been ordered to take Utica Kurgan, you've reached the battlefield and you're in some sort of starting position (Editor's note - we're talking about terms from the game, where the organization and nomenclature is adapted a bit to the mechanics. A large number of games work with you commanding brigades or divisions even if it is not historically accurate terminology or organization).

How quickly was an officer able to react at the brigade, corps, or army corps level the moment he discovered that a subordinate officer was not "following" orders.

JS: I don't know if that can be answered in a general way. What orders would a subordinate not follow? There could be a zillion reasons. Didn't he form his battalions as directed? Didn't he have enough room to do it? Didn't have enough time? Did the enemy get in the way? A superior can react as quickly as his horse and distance will allow him or his AdC. And, of course, and we see this in our funny "battles" in re-enactment, the situation that a commander sees and assesses from his position will be different the moment he makes a decision, different the moment the order is transmitted, and different the moment it is carried out. These are all things that need to be accounted for.

It makes little sense, for example, to send an AdC to the commander of a brigade threatened by a cavalry charge to form a square; unless it is somehow obvious that he is unaware of it, etc., he should be able to assess such a situation in a standard way and take some action of his own, that is what he is there for, but the point is to estimate further developments and send reinforcements to arrive at the threatened section and help to resolve the situation that arises and which cannot now be prevented.

R: In Napoleon's case, the battle orders were quite detailed, but as you write in your article about the mixed formation, the corps commanders executed them in their own way anyway. The individual column commanders ignored these superior orders as well. They make decisions independently so that the objective is met.  Or is it the other way around, a more rigid, literal solution and the attack on the Pratec Heights being the exception?

JS: You're referring to the gradual evolution of opinion about the appropriate formation of the main strike force at Austerlitz, I guess. The main thing you can see in this is that Napoleon didn't underestimate this dimension of the matter, he had his own opinion on it, and at the same time he wasn't the most skilled practitioner in this regard - But he was able to take the advice. In 1805, to his credit, he still was. It cannot be said that the Corps commanders were doing it their own way - but they had convinced him that the theoretical advantages of complex systems could very easily turn against their own in battlefield practice.

Complicated those early considerations were, above all, because they tied the hands of division and brigade generals too tightly. The antithesis of the appropriate course of action is best seen at Waterloo, where Napoleon ordered (or authorized the ordering, in any case for which he bears responsibility) the formation of massive columns within which the divisional and brigadier generals no longer had any freedom of maneuver or reaction to the situation whatsoever. The appropriate way is to form the infantry so that not only corps but divisions and brigades can manoeuvre at any moment in any direction. With Napoleon and some of his subordinates we gradually see a certain resignation in this direction, which culminates symbolically at Waterloo.The turning point comes after 1809.

Independent decision-making at all levels of command is not a value in itself. The subordinate must always have in view the more general assignment which determines his direction and aim; and the superior, with his insight in all directions and his theoretically greater experience, can interfere in very minute details without indulging in harmful micromanagement. The essential and salutary thing is when, within the chain of command, officers know each other, have marched together for a long time, have maneuvered together, know their capabilities, and can gauge their procedures.Then they ideally complement each other.

The less this works, the more rigid it is; while if corps commanders are to be expected to take the initiative and have a great deal of freedom of decision, divisional generals are already more bound by their commander's more detailed intent, and at the brigade level there is even less room for this; the battalion is then by default just a tool; if we are talking about a regular field battle. And there are a number of wise sayings on this; for example, Gouvion Saint-Cyr said: "the moment that subordinates cannot do all that is required of them, they begin to do only what they themselves want to do"; and "This is only another reason why we should never, in framing an order, leave an officer, of whatever rank, the choice of what he is to execute; we may be almost sure that he will give preference, not to what will be advantageous to the service in general, but to what he finds in the interest of his unit or his own, or at least to what will be easiest".

Of course, we're not talking about the mechanics of small tactics on the battlefield here; it's a more general problem. Even in the context of deploying a force of arms on the battlefield against the enemy, it is certainly desirable that subordinates know exactly what their superiors expect of them, and that it is within their power to carry it out. That a subordinate commander would go on the offensive in a formation other than the designated one? Unless he didn't understand and there was no time to correct him.

R: Is it realistic for it to happen that one of your brigades goes on the offensive, but because I made a bad roll (i.e., the adjutant didn't arrive with the order, or mistook the transmitted order, or can't read it after Napoleon) the other brigade is left standing in the boarding area because it doesn't know what to do?

JS: It can certainly happen. So, of course, the "brigade is left standing" is a problem that can be solved quite easily and quickly. The bigger problem is when the brigade moves forward when it shouldn't have.That, by the way, was probably one of the reasons for the disastrous employment of the French cavalry at Waterloo. Because once (especially, but not only) cavalry moves, stopping it is (can be) already a difficult problem. Delays are part of the thing. It's hardly so mechanical that brigades that are part of the same formation don't respond to an order given. We can imagine, for example, that they stall while passing through a village to a deployment area because another formation crosses their path, etc. Not every commander is zealous and conscientious; he may take his time for a number of reasons. But that a battle line should be commanded forward, and one of the brigades should fail to respond, I cannot imagine. Mishearing, misunderstanding, confusion; within minutes and hundreds of yards. Generally on these things, units execute, unless otherwise directed, what they see their neighbors execute towards the commander's position, usually the center. The aforementioned Infantry Regulations of August 1, 1791, say in the introduction to the Evolutions of the Line (which, for the sake of example, are the manoeuvre of a division of eight battalions), "In case the chief of a battalion did not hear the general command, but saw a battalion directly adjacent to him execute a movement, he would immediately have the same movement executed by his battalion." And the same, within the admittedly very chequered tree of possibilities in entry dispositions, also applies to brigades or divisions - although there the manoeuvre is usually much less mechanical.

R: This can be followed up by what happens when the order arrives, but the situation on the battlefield has changed so that the order is now obsolete and unrealistic. Is the commander able to respond flexibly to the changing situation?

JS: The lower down the chain of command, the more flexible, within my situation; if there is an opportunity not to get shot at from the side, I will automatically take it, of course. I've mentioned this problem before, that is, the changing situation over time, and the need to anticipate what is going to happen when my orders are yet to be transmitted and carried out. I guess we'd have to talk about the specific circumstances. However, in principle it is the same at all levels, and certainly, responding to a changing situation is necessary and part of the point: Mouton was ordered at Waterloo to deploy to the second line behind d'Erlon, but because the Prussians were pushing into his right flank, he turned his corps 90° to the east. At Austerlitz, Major Bigarré marched with both battalions of the 4th Regiment on the Old Vineyards in some set direction, but the Russian Guards cavalry came charging towards him from over the horizon. He really did not need to wait for an order from the brigade or division commander to form square.

R: From my point of view, a lot of wargaming games substitute confused orders (Grouchy at Waterloo, D'Erlon at Quatre Brass/Ligny, Ney at Bautzen, Junot at Valitona Gora) that take place outside, say, the line of engagement, but somewhere in the rear with the possibility of misunderstanding the order when you're already showering lead on each other.

How capable were infantry or cavalry commanders at battalion or squadron level of independently developed combat action within the framework of synergy, situational awareness, or intent we discussed earlier? That is, how realistic is it that a battalion "forgets" what it is supposed to do. Or that the cavalry will forget they are on the battlefield and their only interest will be to return to the deployment area or back to the allies?

JS: Absolutely minimal, nothing like that is either desirable or sustainable in the long term.

If a chief of battalion has to deal with his tactical situation, it is indeed a last resort. His focus, as I said, is primarily on his own formation - controlling it, directing it, determining its method of fire, and checking that everything is done properly and reliably. He doesn't have much time to observe and comprehensively assess his tactical situation - that's what his brigadier general is there for. If the enemy appears on the left flank of the battalion and starts shooting at me, my solution of turning the battalion's front in his direction or detaching several pelotons may not be appropriate/sufficient/desirable. The general may want to send a battalion in from the second line. Or he may perceive, rather than I, that there is a disproportionately greater problem in my current direction, and this enemy actions are just a diversion, etc. etc. etc. If I have no general present and effectively commanding over me, I have no choice but to react as I judge for myself, with all the risks that entails.

It is probably important to perceive the diversity of the situations we are discussing. In another situation, you have a light infantry battalion commander who is doing some reconnaissance or other task somewhere in front of the army; in another situation, you have a line infantry battalion chief who is part of a standard battle line during some general battle.

"Forget what to do" can be illustrated again by the example of Slavkov by the way; not at the level of a battalion or brigade, but directly at the level of two army corps. In front of Murat and Lannes, Bagration retreated, while according to Napoleon's battle plan he should not have been fought at all, because Napoleon did not foresee his presence there. They did engage, they succeeded, though not substantially, they clashed head-on and had more forces, they were better disposed. But they stopped. Napoleon paid attention to the southern section of the battlefield, he did not look north, and in fact he did not care what was happening there. And so his two divisions of infantry and practically the entire cavalry reserve stopped; they did not pursue the retreating Bagration. Murat was in supreme command there; he alone did not decide on the next advance, he did not receive orders from Napoleon, he did not actively solicit them himself, and in his report he contented himself with indicating that he would have taken the heights of Rausnitz and Austerlitz, but as there was still fighting on the right he thought it necessary to keep the troops ready and to secure the occupied area of the Olmütz road. Be that as it may, Bagration retreated peacefully as a result.

If Murat had stuck to Napoleon's original plan, he would have headed for the Pratec heights after his unexpected engagement with Bagration. But he would have arrived too late and would have been no good there.

R: In conclusion, then, we can say that commanders at all levels should be able to conduct maneuvers independently, to conduct combat independently in accordance with the overall plan, but it depends on the abilities of individual commanders.

JS: They certainly technically can. Their hands are mostly tied by their reduced situational awareness. But mainly, the commanders of the basic tactical units should not be put in a situation where they have to react independently. Simply put, the brigadier general is the tank commander, the battalion chief is the driver and gunner.

And in fact, one could even say that if the battalion chief is the gunner and driver, the captains and lieutenants are the loader and the gearbox :-)) ...but here too it depends on the situation. If we deploy the peloton in a loose formation out of close coordination with the battalion in the open field, then the captain is in the position of the commander of the basic tactical unit; and depending on the task, he must also often be very flexible in adapting to the situation.

Because light infantry is more frequently deployed in this way, its officers have more experience, and this in turn translates into the relatively greater effectiveness of this weapon in such situations.

 

Jakub, thanks for the interview, we'll look forward to talking more about the beer. And for our readers, a second round of questions is already in the works